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ABSTRACT
The Performance Cost of Security
Lucy Bowen
Historically, performance has been the most important feature when optimizing com-
puter hardware. Modern processors are so highly optimized that every cycle of com-
putation time matters. However, this practice of optimizing for performance at all
costs has been called into question by new microarchitectural attacks, e.g. Meltdown
and Spectre. Microarchitectural attacks exploit the effects of microarchitectural com-
ponents or optimizations in order to leak data to an attacker. These attacks have
caused processor manufacturers to introduce performance impacting mitigations in
both software and silicon.
To investigate the performance impact of the various mitigations, a test suite of forty-
seven different tests was created. This suite was run on a series of virtual machines
that tested both Ubuntu 16 and Ubuntu 18. These tests investigated the performance
change across version updates and the performance impact of CPU core number
vs. default microarchitectural mitigations. The testing proved that the performance
impact of the microarchitectural mitigations is non-trivial, as the percent difference
in performance can be as high as 200%.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Performance has always been one of the most important factors in computer design
[36]. As figure 1.1 shows, over time the gap in performance between the memory and
CPU has widened. In order to take advantage of the CPU speed, various microarchi-
tectural optimizations were created. Sadly, recent research shows these optimizations
can leak privileged information if exploited by savvy attackers [19]. Processor man-
ufacturers and operating system programmers have created software based solutions
to these exploits, they are not all-encompassing, and some exploits can only be solved
with hardware changes [44]. Several software solutions are harmful to performance,
but these should be temporary measures as new hardware is designed.
Figure 1.1: Performance: Memory vs. Process [36]
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It is important to quantify how much performance has been lost for the sake of secu-
rity. Users are allowed to disable these mitigations, even if it is to their own detriment.
Those with performance-intensive tasks: simulation running, image creation / ren-
dering, video encoding, etc., may desire to regain the previous performance. A user
could chose to take the risk with removing the mitigations, or if they wanted to keep
some security, instead use a dedicated machine for those tasks and ensure that it
contains no sensitive information.
This paper is a comprehensive analysis of the performance impact from the software
based mitigations on different patch levels of Ubuntu 16 and Ubuntu 18, and the
affect of allocating differing numbers of cores to the latest patch. By using a test-
suite consisting of forty-six different tests, a quantitative summary of the performance
impacts was created. Analysis of these tests showed that the mitigations had a
quantifiable affect, with some being negligible but others has as much as three orders
of magnitude difference in performance.
Chapter 2 provides background into the various microarchitectural optimizations and
the attacks on them. The design and implementation of experiment are covered in
Chapters 3 and 4, with an explanation of the tests in the test-suite in the former
and an explanation of the software mitigations in the latter. Chapter 5 presents an
analysis of both the individual test results and of the results when compared as a
group. Potential future work and conclusions are presented in Chapters 6 and 7,
respectively.
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Chapter 2
BACKGROUND
Many of the microarchitectural optimizations that exist within modern processors
were first created decades ago. A sampling of these optimizations can be seen in
table 2.1, along with their year of introduction to consumer hardware. However, these
same optimizations that are critical to modern design and performance, have recently
been proven to have massive, difficult to fix, security flaws. A previously dangerous
security attack type, cache timing attacks, have been adapted to attack how these
optimizations work together to increase performance. By doing this, attackers can
leak sensitive data without a trace.
This chapter covers how different microarchitectural optimizations work, how cache
timing attacks work, and what the recent high profile microarchitectural attacks are.
Table 2.1: Optimization and Year Implemented by Intel
Optimization Intel Micro-Architecture Year
Instruction Pipelining 8086 1978
Dynamic Execution i686 1995
Simultaneous Multithreading NetBurst 2002
Cache L1 i486 1989
Cache L2 i686 1995
Cache L3 Nehalem 2008
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Figure 2.1: Pipelining Diagram [23]
2.1 Instruction Pipelining
Instruction Pipelining is a technique where multiple instructions are overlapped in
execution in order to increase throughput. As seen in Figure 2.1, the pipeline is
divided in stages where each stage completes part of an instruction in parallel. The
time required to move an instruction one step further in the pipeline is a machine
cycle. Due to how the stages interact, all stages must be ready to proceed at the
same time, and the length of the machine cycle is determined by the time required
for the slowest pipe stage. Because of this, modern pipelines have been increasing in
depth by splitting up the pipeline stages into increasingly smaller chunks [36].
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(a) Assembly Instructions
In Order Execution
(b) In Order
Execution Flow
Figure 2.2: In Order Execution
(a) Assembly Instructions
Out of Order Execution
(b) Out of Order
Execution Flow
Figure 2.3: Out of Order Execution
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2.2 Dynamic Execution
Dynamic execution, also called out-of-order execution, is a collection of optimizations
designed to utilize potentially wasted clock cycles. They allow a processor to avoid
stalls when the data needed to perform an operation is unavailable. Comparing
Figure 2.2 to Figure 2.3 shows the performance gained when switching to out-of-
order execution; information from [1, 31]. Dynamic execution has a greater benefit
with longer pipelines, and when the clockspeed of the CPU is significantly higher
than the speed of the main memory bank [36]. Dynamic execution is composed of
three parts: data flow analysis, speculative execution, and branch prediction.
2.2.1 Data Flow Analysis
Data-flow analysis is used to align instructions for optimal execution, as opposed
to executing them in the order they came in. This allows for a CPU to fill empty
pipeline slots with instructions that are ready to execute. At the end of the process the
results are re-ordered so that it appears that instructions were processed normally.
The sequential ordering of the original code is program order, while the changed
processor order is data order [36]. Complex circuitry is needed to convert from one
ordering to the other while maintaining logical ordering.
2.2.2 Speculative Execution
Speculative execution is a CPU optimization where a processor executes instructions
that may be incorrect. This allows the CPU to work ahead when it has idle time, i.e.
when there is a conditional branch that has an as of yet, unknown direction. The CPU
uses branch prediction to guess the direction, and save the current register state as
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(a) Simple Program Flow
(b) No Speculative Execution
(c) Misprediction
(d) Correct Prediction
Figure 2.4: Speculative Execution Pipelines
before subsequent instructions start executing. Afterwards, when the direction of the
branch is known, the guess made is validated. If the guess was incorrect, the program
state is reverted back and the execution of the correct path is initiated instead, while
the pending instructions from the incorrect guess are abandoned [19]. The potential
performance gain from this working ahead can be seen in Figure 2.4. Figure 2.4 also
shows that the performance impact when incorrect is negligible.
2.2.3 Branch Prediction
Branch prediction is an optimization that allows for a CPU to accurately guess the
direction of conditional branches in order to start speculative execution. When a
branch instruction is encountered, the processor must make a prediction on the direc-
tion it will take, either “taken” or “not taken”. A conditional branch that is “taken”
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is a jump that goes to a different location in program memory where the second
branch of code is stored, while a “not taken” branch falls through the block to the
code which immediately follows the jump. The processor does not know for certain if
a conditional jump will be taken or not taken until the condition has been calculated
and the conditional jump has passed the execution stage in the instruction pipeline.
In order to make an accurate guess, a predictor will have both local and global predic-
tors [36]. To further increase performance, whenever a branch instruction is executed,
the corresponding correct jump location is cached in the Branch Target Buffer (BTB)
where it can be used as a guess for the same branch instruction when it is executed
again later [19].
2.3 Simultaneous Multithreading
Simultaneous multithreading is an optimization that allows for multiple independent
threads of execution to use a shared CPU core. This optimization is how the CPU can
have not only multiple threads executing simultaneously, but also multiple processes
which have their own page tables, privilege levels, I/O permissions, etc. The threads
and processes running on the same core are considered completely separated [36].
Simultaneous multithreading allows for instructions from more than one thread to be
executed in any given pipeline stage at a time. The number of concurrent threads can
be as few as two concurrent threads per CPU core, but some processors support up
to eight. Extra threads can also be used proactively to seed a shared resource like a
cache, to improve the performance of another single thread, or to provide redundant
computation for error detection and recovery [27].
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2.4 CPU Caches
The CPU cache is a small, fast memory module located close to the processor core.
By buffering frequently used data, it is able to hide the slow latency to main memory.
Modern CPU architectures implement n-way set-associative caches, where the cache
is divided into cache sets, and each cache set comprises n cache lines. A line is loaded
in a set depending on its address, and each line can occupy any of the n ways. The
processors cache replacement policy dictates the cache line that is replaced when new
data is loaded, so that the CPU can achieve optimal cache usage [36]. If a program
requests data that is already in the cache, that is a cache hit. However, if the data
requested is not in the cache, and needs to be fetched from a lower level - that
being a lower cache level, main memory, or the hard-drive - it is called a miss. The
unprivileged clflush instruction evicts a cache line from the entire cache hierarchy,
but a program can also evict a cache line by accessing enough memory. As seen in 2.5,
modern Intel processors have at least three cache levels, with one or more of those
levels shared between the cores on multi-core processors [66].
Figure 2.5: Cache Levels on Multicore Architecture
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2.4.1 L1 Cache
The L1 cache is also known as the “primary cache”, and is the highest level of cache.
This is because it is the closest to the processor and the fastest memory in the
computer. Figure 2.5 shows that it is both the smallest cache level and is divided into
two distinct caches, one for memory and one for instructions [36, 66]. The instruction
cache works as an input cache, and is particularly efficient when the program starts to
repeat a small part of itself, i.e. a loop. In some micro-architectures the L1 instruction
cache is used to store additional control-flow data, in order to speed up the decoding
process. The data cache is both an input and an output cache; it is used to store the
data that is going to be written back to memory as well as the data that was most
recently used [36].
2.4.2 L2 Cache
The L2 cache feeds the L1 cache, and is made of memory that is slower than L1
memory. Before being placed on chip in 1995, it existed on the motherboard, and
was therefore impacted by bus speed [66]. Unlike the L1 cache, which is always unique
to a core, the L2 cache varies depending on the micro-architectural design. It may
be shared between all cores, groups of cores (i.e. each set of two or four), or as figure
2.5 shows, be individual to each core [40]. Most Intel L2 caches are inclusive of L1,
i.e. all data within the L1 data and instruction caches are also stored within it. This
allows for data that is evicted from L1 to be retrieved quickly from L2; this is useful
when the working set of a program is larger than the size of the L1 cache. For this to
work, L2 associativity must be equal to or greater than L1 associativity irrespective
of the number of sets [36].
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2.4.3 L3 Cache
The L3 cache, also called last-level cache, is often shared between all CPU cores, and
is inclusive of all cache levels above it, i.e. the data within all L1 and L2 caches is
also present in the L3 cache. Newer Intel processors, Sandy-Bridge (2011) and later,
divide the L3 into per-core slices, which are connected by a ring bus; figure 2.5. The
ring bus is a scalable bus that allows many physical cores to connect to the cache
at once, while allowing for the cache to run at core clock speed [61]. Slices can be
accessed concurrently and are effectively separate caches, although the bus ensures
that each core can access the full L3, albeit with higher latency for remote slices
[48]. Because of the inclusively, executing code or accessing data on one core has
immediate consequences even for the private caches of the other cores [66]. This can
be exploited in cache attacks.
Figure 2.6: Increasing Prevalence of Side-Channel Attacks in Literature
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2.5 Cache Attack
Historically in computer security, solutions which used powerful encryption/decryp-
tion algorithms with cryptographic keys were considered secure. If a cryptographic
algorithm is given a large enough key, brute force attacks become computationally
infeasible. Therefore, sometimes attackers instead target the physical implementa-
tion in hardware in order to take advantage of some physical information leaked by a
cryptographic device. This is a side channel attack, where the information is gained
from the implementation of a computer system, rather than weaknesses in the im-
plemented algorithm itself [19]. Figure 2.6 shows that this type of attack and its
sub-types are becoming more common [65].
A timing attack is an attack based on measuring how much time various computations
take to perform. Cache attacks are a subset of timing attacks, which focus on exploit-
ing the timing differences caused by the lower latency of CPU caches when compared
to physical memory [19]. This attack targets the micro-architectural design of the
CPU by monitoring the cache accesses in a shared physical system and is commonly
used against virtualized environments or cloud services [75]. These attacks have a
similar execution pattern where the attacker finds a way to manipulate the cache to
a known state, waits for victim activity and then examines what has changed. While
other attacks exist, the three most well known are the Prime + Probe attack, the
Evict + Time attack, and the Flush + Reload attack, with many of the other existing
cache attacks being derivations or combinations of them.
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2.5.1 Prime + Probe
The Prime + Probe attack was one of the first two cache attacks discovered, in 2005. It
is performed by priming the victim's cache by filling it with known attacker addresses.
While the victim carries out normal tasks, some attack data will be evicted from the
cache. When the attacker probes the primed space, they can time the access time
to learn if memory congruent with a cache set was used. By doing so, the attacker
gains intimate knowledge of both the victims activities, and the contents the victim
replaces controlled data with [52]. This attack can target both static and dynamically
allocated memory, but only works with inclusive caches. While the attack does not
need to share memory with the victim, it does need to share the same CPU socket.
It requires live analysis of the data being replaced, and is only accurate to cache set
congruence, but is performable using Javascript [19].
2.5.2 Evict + Time
The Evict + Time attack was the other cache attack discovered in 2005. To perform
it, the attack must execute and time a function that primes the cache. Then, the
attacker must evict a line from the cache, and re-time the priming function. If the
function is faster the second time it is called, it likely used an address congruent
to the cache set [52]. In its most basic form this attack is only accurate to cache
set congruence. While it requires a function call to be executed, the results can be
analyzed later instead of live, and the attack is possible in Javascript [19].
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Figure 2.7: Distribution of Load Times [75]
2.5.3 Flush + Reload
Flush + Reload was discovered in 2014 and is a generic last level cache side-channel
attack that takes advantage of executable code page sharing between processes. When
a user runs a program, the operating system loads the program into physical memory.
If additional users run the same program, rather than loading duplicate tables, the
operating system will instead set each additional user's page tables to use a copy of
the page table that was loaded into memory for the first user. This physical memory
is read-only, and thus there should be no difference between one to n users reading
it. However, if one user is instead an attacker using Flush + Reload, they can watch
a number of cache lines, called “probes,” which are specified as addresses in the
victim program's executable code. By flushing these lines out of the cache, waiting,
then timing how long it takes to read them, the attacker can determine if they were
replaced in the cache – a fast read after the flush means the victim replaced them
by accessing them, while a slow read means the victim hasn’t [75]. Figure 2.7 shows
the dramatically different access times when accessing lines that were replaced. This
attack is the fastest cache attack, and with cache line accuracy, the attack with the
best resolution. However, it requires shared memory with the victim, does not work
on Javascript, and requires a live analysis of the data [19].
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Figure 2.8: Timeline of Microarchitectural Attacks
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2.6 Microarchitectural Attacks
Microarchitectural attacks are attacks which exploit the effects of microarchitectural
components or optimizations. Since January 2018 the field has been in the news
due to high profile, difficult-to-fix attacks, specifically ones based on the Meltdown
and Spectre attacks. Figure 2.8 is a timeline of published research since the initial
release of Meltdown and Spectre and it shows that even with an embargo of up to a
year, research in this field is booming. Meltdown- and Spectre-type attacks are both
speculative execution based attacks; the former attacks obtain data from instructions
following a fault, while the latter attack prediction units [19]. Microarchitectural Data
Sampling is a new attack type that instead targets small frequently overwritten buffers
used in speculative execution. The microarchitectural attacks Nemesis, TLBleed and
Spoiler use concepts from the above attack types but are not, themselves, members
of them.
2.6.1 Meltdown-Type Attacks
Meltdown, once a single attack, has become the name of an overarching attack type
where information is gained from transient executions following a faulting instruction.
This attack type exploits out-of-order execution by extracting data from faulting in-
structions that are forwarded ahead in the pipeline. Meltdown attacks use transient
execution to “melt down” architectural isolation barriers by computing on unautho-
rized results of faulting instructions, thus transiently bypassing hardware-enforced
security policies in order to leak data that was architecturally inaccessible for the
application. They reflect a failure of the CPU to respect hardware-level protection
boundaries for transient instructions [22].
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Figure 2.9: Meltdown Attack Logo [47]
2.6.1.1 Original Meltdown
Meltdown is a security vulnerability that exploits a race condition between memory
access and privilege checking during instruction processing. When running code spec-
ulatively, there are no permission checks to see if the memory accesses from cache
are accessing privileged memory. Instead, instructions are run as fast as possible in
order to not waste CPU resources. During this window without permission checks the
process can access permission protected memory and write to the cache. The permis-
sion check is only performed after the decision about committing to the speculation.
However, because the cache is modified regardless of if the speculation is committed
or not, an attacker can use this to modify the cache. Later they can access those
addresses legitimately, gaining access to data previously inaccessible to it [47].
Figure 2.10: Foreshadow Attack Logo [70]
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2.6.1.2 Foreshadow
Foreshadow is a Meltdown variant which exploits Intel's Software Guard Extensions.
Intel designed the Software Guard Extensions (SGX) to allow user-level code to al-
locate private regions of memory, called enclaves, that are protected from processes
running at higher privilege levels. Normally, when there is an attempt to read mem-
ory, a process can use speculative execution to modify the cache based on the data
that was read. When the processor detects that this process involves enclave memory
instead of normal memory, and that reading is not permitted, then the processor is
allowed to block speculation. Because speculation has been blocked, there should
be no cache modification. However, if the read is from Level 1 cache, speculative
execution can finish before the blocking permission check has finished [70].
2.6.1.3 Foreshadow-NG
Foreshadow-NG is a continuation on Foreshadow which proved that the attack was not
limited to Intel SGX and could instead be used for extracting any information resid-
ing in the L1 cache. This attack completely bypasses the virtual memory abstraction
by directly exposing cached physical memory contents to unprivileged applications
and guest virtual machines. An attacker could get information belonging to any-
one, including the System Management Mode, the Kernel, or other Virtual Machines
running on third-party clouds [74].
2.6.1.4 Rogue System Register Read
Rogue System Register Read is a Meltdown variant which exploits speculative system
register reads. Processors can speculatively read system registers not accessible at
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the current exception level, provided that it is a register that can be read without
side-effects. This access returns a speculative register value which is used in sub-
sequent speculative load instructions. If the speculation is not correct, the results
are discarded, however, the data returned from the inaccessible system register can
be used to perform further speculation. This speculation can be exploited by the
speculation-based cache timing side-channels [38].
2.6.1.5 Lazy FP State Restore
Lazy FP State Restore is a Meltdown-type exploit that targets the optimization called
lazy FPU context switching. Lazy FPU context switching is an optimization where
the operating system can defer the context switch of the FPU and SIMD register set
until the first instruction is executed that needs access to these registers. This allows
old content to be left in place in case the current task doesn't use those registers.
The processor does this by offering the ability to toggle the availability of instructions
utilizing floating point and SIMD registers, and if the instructions are turned off, any
attempt of executing them will generate a fault, Using Lazy FP State Restore, an
attacker can recover the FPU and SIMD register set of arbitrary processes or VMs
by reconstructing the FPU and SIMD register content of other processes or virtual
machines after the fault indicating the first use of FPU or SIMD instructions [63].
2.6.2 Spectre Type Attacks
Like Meltdown, the original Spectre attack, made up of Variants 1 and 2, has grown
to encompass its own attack type. Spectre-type attacks exploit transient execution
following control or data flow misprediction, and thus rely on dedicated control or
dataflow prediction machinery. In Spectre-type attacks, transient instructions only
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Figure 2.11: Spectre Attack Logo [44]
compute on data which the application is also allowed to access architecturally, which
allows the attacks to transiently bypass software-defined security policies in order
to leak secrets out of the program's intended code/data paths. Successful Spectre
attacks steer a victim into transiently computing on memory locations the victim is
authorized to access but the attacker is not, and then leaking the data. This leakage
is an unintended side-effect of important performance optimizations, so mitigating
Spectre-type attacks requires careful hardware-software co-design [22].
2.6.2.1 Variant One
Variant One attacks the CPU branch predictor by mistraining it into mispredicting
the direction of a branch. This causes the CPU to temporarily violate the program
semantics by executing code that would not have been executed otherwise. This
incorrect speculative execution allows an attacker to read secret information stored
in the program's address space [44].
2.6.2.2 Variant Two
Variant Two attacks the Branch Target Buffer, BTB, using techniques from return-
oriented programming [60]. In return-oriented programming, the attacker gains con-
trol of the call stack to hijack program control flow and proceeds to execute specific
machine instruction sequences already present in the machine's memory. These ma-
chine instructions are known as gadgets, and typically end in a return instruction.
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They are normally located in a subroutine within the existing program and/or shared
library code. Using Variant Two, the attacker chooses a gadget from the victim's ad-
dress space and influences the victim to speculatively execute the gadget, but unlike
previous return-oriented programming attacks, there does not need to be a vulner-
ability in the victim code. Instead, the attacker trains BTB to mispredict a branch
from an indirect branch instruction to the address of the gadget, resulting in specula-
tive execution of the gadget. While the effects of incorrect speculative execution are
eventually reverted, their effects on the cache are not, thereby allowing the gadget to
leak sensitive information via a cache side channel [44].
2.6.2.3 SGXPectre
SGXPectre is a Spectre-type attack that uses branch prediction to leak secrets from
SGX enclaves. The branch prediction of enclave code can be influenced by non-
enclave programs, thus the control flow of the enclave program can be temporarily
altered to execute instructions that lead to observable cache-state changes. Attackers
can watch the cache state in order to learn the secrets inside enclave memory or its
internal registers, thus defeating the SGX confidentiality guarantee [24].
2.6.2.4 BranchScope
BranchScope is a Spectre-type attack that targets the directional component of the
branch predictor. The attacking process infers the direction of an arbitrary condi-
tional branch instruction in a victim program by manipulating the shared directional
branch predictor. When forced, predictors will revert to the backup two bit predictor,
allowing for attacks on complex hybrid predictors. By causing collisions between its
branches and the branches of the victim process in the Pattern History Table (PHT)
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an attacker can uncover the direction of the victim's branches, and is thus able to
obtain secret bits with a low degree of error, even when the victim process was inside
an Intel SGX [29].
2.6.2.5 Speculative Store Bypass
Speculative Store Bypass is a Spectre-type attack that exploits speculative execution
around memory stores. Processors can allow loads to speculatively execute even if the
address of a preceding potentially overlapping store is unknown. This can potentially
allow these loads to read stale data values speculatively. Although the processor will
correct for such cases later, in the interim an attacker can use speculative execution
to reveal the value of memory that is not normally accessible to them. This has been
proven with proof of concept code using Flush + Reload and Prime + Probe, but
only in managed runtimes, where an attacker is able to influence the generation of
code [38].
2.6.2.6 Bounds Check Bypass Store
Bounds Check Bypass Store is based off of Spectre Variant 1 and leverages speculative
stores to create speculative buffer overflows, allowing it to modify data and code
pointers. During speculative execution, the processor may ignore the bounds checks
which provides an attacker with the full power of an arbitrary write. While this is
only a speculative write, it can still lead to information disclosure. Using this, a proof
of concept attack was created that used return-oriented programming techniques [43].
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2.6.2.7 Speculative Store Read-Only Overwrite
Speculative Store Read-only Overwrite is based off of both Spectre Variant 1 and
Meltdown. By exploiting the lazy enforcement of the User/Supervisor protection
flags for page-table entries, it can use the same mechanism as Meltdown to bypass the
Read/Write page table entry flags. By doing this, speculative stores can overwrite
read-only data, code pointers, and code metadata, including v-tables, GOT/IAT,
and control-flow mitigation metadata. As a result, any sandboxing that depends on
hardware enforcement of read-only memory is rendered ineffective. Additionally, the
mitigations created for Meltdown do not affect this Spectre variant [43].
2.6.2.8 SpectreRSB and ret2spec
SpectreRSB and ret2spec are Spectre-type exploits that target the Return Stack
Buffer, RSB, in order to expose sensitive information. The two expoits were published
separately but attack the same target with similar strategies. The RSB is a processor
structure used to predict return address by pushing the return address from a call
instruction on an internal hardware stack. When the return is encountered, the
processor uses the top of the RSB to predict the return address to support speculation
with very high accuracy. The SpectreRSB exploit shows that the RSB can be easily
manipulated by user code by using a call instruction to cause a value to be pushed to
the RSB. Then the stack can be manipulated by the user so that the return address
no longer matches the RSB, thus allowing for an attack similar to Spectre v1. Using
this exploit, proof of concept attacks have been shown to be successful on both local
and SGX protected memory [45]. The other attack, ret2spec, also poisoned the RSB
in order to force a process to execute arbitrary code speculatively, and thus report
potential secrets. However, ret2spec has a more advanced, second attack, which
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allows attackers to abuse RSBs to trigger speculation of arbitrary code inside the
same process without requiring a context switch. Proof of concept code showed this
working with WebAssembly, which allowed an attacker to read data from arbitrary
memory addresses and bypass memory sandboxing [49]. Additionally, the mitigations
created for previous Spectre attacks do not affect SpectreRSB or ret2spec [45, 49].
2.6.2.9 NetSpectre
NetSpectre adapts Spectre variant one into a generic, remote attack. Prior to this, all
Spectre attacks required local code execution on the target system, so systems where
attackers could not run code were thought safe. This attack has been shown to work
both in local-area networks and between virtual machines in the cloud, and showed
that even devices which do not run potentially attacker controlled code are now at
risk for Spectre attacks [59].
2.6.2.10 SplitSpectre
SplitSpectre is a variation of Spectre variant one. The original Spectre v1 requires a
gadget to be present in the victim's attack surface. However, by splitting the original
Spectre v1 gadget into two parts, SplitSpectre can be run within the attacker's own
malicious code, instead of the target's kernel, simplifying the exploitation procedure
and extending the length of the speculative execution window. A proof of concept of
the attack has been created in Javascript [3].
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Figure 2.12: Microarchitectural Data Sampling Logo [56]
2.6.3 Microarchitectural Data Sampling
Microarchitectural Data Sampling, MDS, is a class of CPU vulnerability that does
not rely on assumptions about memory layout, or depend on the processor cache
state. This separates them from Meltdown- and Spectre-like attacks; however, several
MDS attacks are also counted as Meltdown-type attacks due to their use of fault or
exception exploitation. Because of the lack of assumptions, MDS attacks are difficult
to mitigate, though the structures involved are relatively small and are overwritten
more frequently. Thus, benefiting from the exploit is difficult and requires an attack
to collect a large amount of information in order to target a specific memory value.
Using MDS, attackers can extract data from other programs on the same machine,
across security boundaries, including SGX enclave boundaries. Like other speculative
execution attacks, MDS based attacks do not leave evidence in system logs, making
them effectively untraceable. Additionally, though using the vulnerability requires an
attacker to have the ability to locally execute code, Javascript attacks have already
been created [56]. Intel has stated that select 8th Gen and 9th Gen CPUs are already
protected against the flaw, and that all future CPUs will include hardware mitigation.
However, the researchers who discovered these flaws disagree and insist that the chips
are still affected [67].
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Figure 2.13: Fallout Attack Logo [50]
2.6.3.1 Fallout
Fallout is both a Meltdown-type transient execution attack and a MDS attack. It
leaks information from the store buffer by exploiting the Write Transient Forward-
ing optimization, which incorrectly passes values from memory writes to subsequent
memory reads. The store buffer is used when a program writes to memory so that the
program execution can continue while the virtual address is translated to a physical
address. The processor must match the addresses of load instructions against the
store buffer so that subsequent loads do not read stale values from memory. If a po-
tentially stale value is found, it instead forwards the value from the store buffer. Write
Transient Forwarding is used when a load partially matches a preceding store and the
processor determines that it will fail because it could be in the store buffer, so it marks
the load as faulty, and incorrectly forwards the value of the partially matched store
from the store buffer. Using this, an attacker can reconstruct privileged information
recently written by the kernel. As a Meltdown-type attack, Fallout exploits transient
execution past an exception; however because the adversary does not read from the
address of the protected value, and instead can load from an unrelated memory ad-
dress in order to leak information, it is also an MDS attack. Because of this, not
only do the current hardware countermeasures for Meltdown-type attacks not work
against it, the newer Intel processors which were created to combat Meltdown and
Spectre are instead more vulnerable than the older generations [50].
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2.6.3.2 Rogue In-Flight Data Load
Rogue In-Flight Data Load, RIDL, is a speculative execution attack that is able
to leak arbitrary data across address spaces and privilege boundaries. It is not a
variant of other speculative execution based attacks, i.e. Meltdown- or Spectre-based
attacks. The cause of the vulnerability is micro-optimizations which cause the CPU
to speculatively serve loads using extraneous CPU-internal in-flight data, e.g. in
the line fill buffers. Because of this, RIDL can leak arbitrary in-flight data without
assumptions about the cache or translation data structures, and can enable system-
wide attacks from arbitrary unprivileged code, including browser based Javascript.
RIDL is not affected by current short term mitigations in software and hardware, and
cannot be easily mitigated by the current heavyweight defenses [72].
2.6.3.3 Store-To-Leak Forwarding
Store-to-Leak Forwarding is a Meltdown-type attack that targets the store buffer and
the TLB. The store buffer is a micro-architectural optimization which serializes the
stream of stores, thus hiding the latency of storing values to memory. It allows the
CPU to complete memory stores asynchronously while the execution stream is out
of order. Due to its asynchronous nature, store-to-load forwarding can happen after
an illegal memory store, thus allowing for Meltdown-like effects. This exploit can
be used to mount side-channel attacks, break the atomicity of Intel's Transactional
Synchronization Extensions, and monitor the control flow of the kernel. Additionally
it can be used for several attacks on address space layout randomization, including
but not limited to: an attack on kernel address space layout randomization, breaking
out from unprivileged applications, and breaking address space layout randomization
using Javascript [57].
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Figure 2.14: ZombieLoad Attack Logo [58]
2.6.3.4 ZombieLoad
Zombieload is a Meltdown-type attack which exploits a processor’s fill-buffer logic.
Load instructions that have to be reissued may transiently de-reference unauthorized
destinations previously brought into the fill buffer by the current or shared logical
CPU. This can leak the data of recently loaded stale values across logical cores [58].
Zombieload has been demonstrated to be effective in multiple practical attacks, in-
cluding attacks across CPU privilege rings, OS processes, virtual machines, and SGX
enclaves. Using this exploit, an attacker can see in real time the websites a victim is
viewing, even if the victim is utilizing the TOR (The Onion Router) browser. An at-
tacker could also acquire passwords, sensitive documents or encryption keys directly
from a CPU [67].
2.6.4 Nemesis
Nemesis is a side channel attack that abuses the CPUs interrupt mechanism to leak
microarchitectural instruction timings from enclaved execution environments. Al-
though Nemesis uses similar microarchitectural behavior to Meltdown, i.e., excep-
tions and interrupts are delayed until instruction retirement, it is not a Meltdown
attack because it does not use information from the faulting instructions but instead
uses timing information. Using Nemesis, an attacker who is controlling system soft-
ware can infer instruction-granular execution state from hardware-enforced enclaves
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by measuring the latency of carefully timed interrupts. Unlike other speculative ex-
ecution vulnerabilities, this attack is applicable to the whole computing spectrum.
Proof of concept code showed interrupt latency revealing microarchitectural instruc-
tion timings from off-the-shelf Intel SGX enclaves [71].
2.6.5 TLBleed
TLBleed is an attack which utilizes machine learning in order to exploit the translation
look-aside buffer, TLB, on processors which use simultaneous multithreading. It uses
a timing attack on the TLB to gain fine-grained information about a victim, and is
possible even when CPU cache uses side-channel protections. By using a machine
learning strategy it can exploit high-resolution temporal features about a victim's
memory activity in order to combat the unknown addressing functions inside the
TLB. The proof of concept exploit can leak a 256-bit EdDSA secret key from a single
capture after 17 seconds of computation time with a 98% success rate, even in the
presence of state-of-the-art cache isolation. Similarly, using a single capture, the proof
of concept can reconstruct 92% of RSA keys from an implementation that is hardened
against FLUSH + RELOAD attacks [33].
2.6.6 Spoiler
Spoiler is a non-Spectre-based speculative execution attack that exploits the depen-
dency resolution logic in order to gain information about the physical page mappings.
This is done via a weakness in the address speculation of Intel's proprietary imple-
mentation of the memory subsystem which directly leaks timing behavior due to
physical address conflicts. By taking advantage of this weakness, Spoiler is able to
improve the Prime + Probe attack's eviction search by a factor of 4096, even from
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sandboxed environments like Javascript. Additionally, Spoiler can be used to improve
the Rowhammer attack by conducting DRAM row conflicts deterministically, and by
demonstrating a double-sided Rowhammer attack with normal user's privilege due to
the possibility of detecting contiguous memory pages [39].
This chapter was about some of the different microarchitectural optimizations used in
modern processors, cache-timing attacks, and the recent high profile microarchitec-
tural attacks that have caused performance decreasing mitigations to be implemented
in the name of security. The next chapter covers the design of the experiment which
investigated how much performance was lost when the mitigations to the microarchi-
tectural attacks were enabled.
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Chapter 3
DESIGN
In order to get a quantifiable impact of the software mitigations to the various mi-
croarchitectural attacks, the performance of many various programs should be looked
at. These programs should cover a large spectrum of possible users, and not simply
be a series of micro-benchmarks, as those are often optimized on by processor manu-
facturers. By using a wide variety of programs different implementations and usecases
can be investigated. Testing on virtual machines allows for additional control con-
ditions to be added and tested without the need to perform the tests on additional,
expensive, hardware. Using a known test-bench software and associated tests allows
for future comparisons to the same dataset.
3.1 Virtual Machines
Running the experiment on virtual machines allows for a comparison of both core
count and vulnerability mitigation. The virtual machines will be different Ubuntu
versions, see Table 3.1. Additionally, by comparing against all of the older versions
of a release, the performance loss or gain from Linux development can be seen. It
should be noted that all versions of Ubuntu 18 have been released since the discovery
of Meltdown and Spectre, while version 16.04.04 on-wards have been influenced by
their discovery.
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Table 3.1: Linux Distribution Patches and Release Dates
Linux Version Release Date
16.04.01 07 - 2016
16.04.02 02 - 2017
16.04.03 08 - 2017
16.04.04 02 - 2018
16.04.05 07 - 2018
16.04.06 03 - 2019
18.04.01 07 - 2018
18.04.02 02 - 2019
3.2 Phoronix Test Suite
The Phoronix Test Suite is a free, open-source benchmark software that supports
Linux, Windows, Apple OS X, GNU Hurd, Solaris and BSD Operating Systems. It
has access to more than 450 test profiles and over 100 test suites via OpenBench-
marking.org, and comes with built-in statistical result reporting. Tests and Test
Suites inside Phoronix are built with eXtensible Markup Language.
3.3 Benchmarks
Traditionally, performance testing uses specific benchmark suites. This is so that
when a new process is released, different agencies can use the same benchmark suites
again and again in order to compare them on the same merits. However, this can
lead to the problem of processors being optimized specifically for those benchmarks.
If those benchmarks have enough depth and breadth this is not a problem, but too
often similar sets of toy-program benchmarks are used. The following benchmarks
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were chosen out of a compromise between time, environment, and function. All of
the chosen benchmarks can run on both Windows and Linux, so that in the future
the results can be compared with Windows results.
3.3.1 PostgreSQL
pgbench is a simple program for running benchmark tests on PostgreSQL. It runs
the same sequence of SQL commands over and over, possibly in multiple concurrent
database sessions, and then calculates the average transaction rate (Transactions
Per Second). By default, pgbench tests a scenario that is loosely based on TPC-B,
involving five SELECT, UPDATE, and INSERT commands per transaction [35]. The
various configurations that the Phoronix Test Suite has created can be seen in Table
3.2. Other options are possible by manually running pgbench; however, by using
the pre-created options provided by Phoronix these results can be easily compared
against both future tests and other tester's work.
Table 3.2: pgbench Options
Scaling Test Mode
Buffer Test Single Thread Read Only
Mostly RAM Normal Load Read Write
On-Disk Heavy Contention
Table 3.3: pgbench Scaling Factors
Scaling Option Scaling Factor
Buffer Test 0.3% of System Memory
Mostly RAM 20% of System Memory
On-Disk 60% of System Memory
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Table 3.4: pgbench Test Factors
Test Variant Client Number Thread Number
Single Thread 1 1
Normal Load 4 * Number of CPU Cores Number of CPU Cores
Heavy Contention 16 * Number of CPU Cores 2 * Number of CPU Cores
3.3.1.1 Scaling
The scaling factor in pgbench is the size of the database to test against. The default
scaling factor of one corresponds to 100k rows in the main data table [35]. There are
three different pre-created scaling options for the pgbench tests: Buffer Test, Mostly
RAM, and On-Disk. In some places the Mostly RAM option is called the Mostly
Cache option due to inconsistent naming. Each of the scaling options initializes
pgbench with a different scaling factor, which can be seen in Table 3.3.
3.3.1.2 Test
The number of clients is the number of concurrent database sessions. The thread
number is the number of worker threads within pgbench. Clients are distributed as
evenly as possible among available threads [35]. There are three different pre-created
test variations: Single Thread, Normal Load, and Heavy Contention. Each uses
different client and thread numbers in their testing, which can be seen in Table 3.4.
3.3.1.3 Mode
The pgbench tests in Phoronix have two pre-defined modes, Read / Write, and Read
Only. The Read / Write mode uses the default built-in transaction script. This script
issues seven commands (made up of a selection from the UPDATE, SELECT, and
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INSERT INTO commands) per transaction over randomly chosen numbers from the
aid, tid, bid, and balance columns. If the Read Only mode is selected then only the
SELECT is used.
3.3.2 DaCapo Benchmarks
The DaCapo benchmarks were created in order to see the complex interactions be-
tween the architecture, compiler, virtual machine, memory management, and applica-
tion. They are written in Java because unlike C, C++, or Fortran, Java use stresses
a machine's memory management and due to its virtual machine, will have more
consistent benchmarks across different hardware [20].
3.3.2.1 Eclipse
Eclipse is a free and open source integrated development environment and is the most
widely used for Java programming. The Eclipse benchmark executes some of the non-
graphical user interface Java Development Tool performance tests for the Eclipse IDE
and measures how many milliseconds the tests take [8].
3.3.2.2 H2
H2 is a relational database management system written in Java. It can be embedded
in Java applications or run in client-server mode. The H2 benchmark executes a
JDBCbench-like in-memory benchmark, executing a number of transactions against
a model of a banking application [8].
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3.3.2.3 Jython
Jython is an implementation of the Python programming language designed to run
on the Java platform. The Jython benchmark interprets the pybench Python bench-
marks [8]. The pybench benchmarks are a collection of tests created to provide a stan-
dardized way of measuring the performance of Python implementations. The tests
inside pybench are micro-benchmarks which each test a different python functionality,
e.g. string comparison, dictionaries with different keys, and simple arithmetic.
3.3.2.4 DayTrader
DayTrader is an Open Source benchmark application emulating an online stock trad-
ing system. Both the TradeBeans and the TradeSoap benchmarks measure the time of
the DayTrader benchmark. Both benchmarks use Apache Geronimo, an open source
application server, and an in-memory H2 database.
The Tradebeans benchmark uses JavaBeans to connect to Apache Geronimo [8]. Jav-
aBeans are classes that encapsulate many objects into a single object, allowing them
to be serializable, have a zero-argument constructor, and allow access to properties
using getter and setter methods.
The TradeSoap benchmark uses SOAP to connect to Apache Geronimo [8]. SOAP
stands for Simple Object Access Protocol. It is an XML-based protocol for accessing
web services.
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3.3.3 SciMark
SciMark was developed by NIST and is widely used by the industry as a floating point
benchmark. It is a benchmark for scientific and numerical computing. It consists of
several subtests: Dense Lower-Upper Matrix Factorization, Fast Fourier Transform,
Jacobi Successive Over-Relaxation, Monte Carlo, and Sparse Matrix Multiply. There
are two versions of this test, one with a “large” dataset, 32 MB, which stresses the
memory subsystem and a “small” dataset which stresses the JVMs, 512 KB. The
units in SciMark 2.0 are MFLOPs (Millions of floating point operations per second)
because some of the benchmarks exercise transcendental functions (e.g. sin, cos)
or integer operations. Therefore, the MFLOP count is only approximate; however,
the same MFLOP count is used consistently, to ensure that comparisons are valid.
SciMark 2.0 focuses only on single-processor performance [53].
This thesis uses both the Java and ANSI C versions of SciMark 2.0. The ANSI C
version uses the “large” dataset, and the Java version the “small” dataset [13, 10].
3.3.3.1 Dense LowerUpper Matrix Factorization
The Dense LowerUpper (LU) matrix factorization benchmark computes the LU fac-
torization of a dense 100x100 matrix using partial pivoting. It exercises linear algebra
kernels and dense matrix operations. The algorithm is the right-looking version of
LU with rank-1 updates. The data size for the “large” version of the benchmark uses
a 1,000 x 1,000 matrix [53].
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3.3.3.2 Fast Fourier Transform
The Fast Fourier Transform benchmark performs a one-dimensional forward trans-
form of 4,000 complex numbers. This kernel exercises complex arithmetic, shuﬄing,
non-constant memory references and trigonometric functions. The first section per-
forms the bit-reversal portion (no flops) and the second performs the actual Nlog(N)
computational steps. The data size for the “large” version of the benchmark is
220(= 1048576) complex numbers [53].
3.3.3.3 Jacobi Successive Over-Relaxation
This benchmark performs a Jacobi Successive Over-Relaxation on a 100x100 grid. It
exercises a typical access pattern in finite difference applications – solving Laplace’s
equation in 2D with Drichlet boundary conditions. The algorithm exercises basic
“grid averaging” memory patterns, where each A(i,j) is assigned an average weighting
of its four nearest neighbors. Some hand-optimizing is done to rows so that they are
aliased in order to streamline the array accesses in the update expression. The data
size for the “large” version of the benchmark uses a 1,000 x 1,000 grid [53].
3.3.3.4 Monte Carlo
The Monte Carlo benchmark approximates the value of Pi by computing the integral
of the quarter circle y = sqrt(1−x2) on [0,1]. It chooses random points and computes
the ratio of those within the circle. The algorithm exercises random-number genera-
tors, synchronized function calls, and function inlining. Because this benchmark uses
only scalars, the “large” and “small” versions are identical [53].
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3.3.3.5 Sparse Matrix Multiply
The Sparse Matrix Multiply benchmark uses an unstructured sparse matrix stored
in compressed-row format with a prescribed sparsity structure. This kernel exercises
indirect addressing and non-regular memory references. The “small” version uses
a 1,000 x 1,000 sparse matrix with 5,000 nonzeros. Each row has approximately
5 nonzeros, evenly spaced between the first column and the diagonal. The “large”
version uses a 100,000 x 100,000 matrix with 1,000,000 nonzeros [53].
3.3.3.6 Composite
The composite benchmark reruns all of the above benchmarks again in order to get
an average MFLOPs number. This number is often used when SciMark is used as an
independent benchmark suite.
3.3.4 Encoding
Encoding is the process of putting a sequence of characters (letters, numbers, punc-
tuation, and certain symbols) into a specialized format for efficient transmission or
storage. This is done through code in order to change original data into a form that
can be used by an external process. Encoding is also used to reduce the size of audio
and video files. Each audio and video file format has a corresponding coder-decoder
(codec) program that is used to code it into the appropriate format and then decodes
for playback.
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Figure 3.1: Screenshot from x264 Test Sample Video
3.3.4.1 LAME MP3 Encoder
LAME is a free and open source MP3 encoder licensed under the LGPL. The name
LAME is a recursive acronym for LAME Ain’t an Mp3 Encoder, presumably due
to the potential software patent issues. The goal of the LAME project is to use the
open source model to improve the psycho acoustics, noise shaping, and speed of MP3.
Although LAME is distributed only as source code, it is used inside popular software
such as FFmpeg, Audacity, WinAmp and Blaze Media Pro. [54] This test measures
the time required to encode a seven minute WAV file to MP3 format [18].
3.3.4.2 x264
x264 is a free and open-source software library and a command-line utility developed
by VideoLAN for encoding video streams into the H.264/MPEG-4 AVC format. It has
SIMD assembly code acceleration on the x86, PowerPC, and ARMv7 platforms. It has
support for different applications, such as television broadcast, Blu-ray low-latency
video applications, and web video and is the core of many web video services, such as
Youtube, Facebook, Vimeo, and Hulu. It is widely used by television broadcasters and
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ISPs. Multiple common video encoding programs are frontends for x264, including
HandBrake, Avidemux, FFmpeg, and MediaCoder. [51] The test of the x264 encoder
tests only the CPU by disabling OpenCL support. It measures how long it takes to
encode a video file [17]. The test’s video file is used under the Creative Commons
license, and is twenty-one seconds of the scene in Figure 3.1.
3.3.5 Ray Tracing
Ray tracing is a technique for rendering three-dimensional graphics with very complex
light interactions, e.g. reflection, refraction, scattering, and dispersion phenomena. It
generates an image by tracing the path of light as pixels in an image plane and then
simulating the effects of that path when it encounters other virtual objects. Although
it has a high computational cost, it is capable of producing a very high degree of
visual realism, usually higher than that of typical scanline rendering methods. [55]
Therefore, ray tracing is best suited for applications where taking a relatively long
time to render a frame can be tolerated, such as in still images and film and television
visual effects. It is poorly suited for real-time applications, such as video games, where
speed is critical.
3.3.5.1 C-Ray
C-Ray is a simple raytracer designed to test the floating-point CPU performance. It
was created because a more advanced raytracer would have more overhead for disk
I/O, shader parsing, and more strain on the memory bandwidth, but would still be
FPU-limited because of the floating-point math. Therefore, being able to test the
bottleneck of the performance without the additional overhead was desirable. The
test is multi-threaded, using 16 threads per core, and shoots 8 rays per pixel [7]. It
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(a) C-Ray sphfract (b) Sunflow Rendering System
Figure 3.2: Ray Tracing Generated Images
measures the generation time of the 1600 x 1200 image – Figure 3.2a.
3.3.5.2 Sunflow Rendering System
The Sunflow Rendering System is a rendering system for photo-realistic image synthe-
sis. It is written in Java and built around a flexible ray tracing core and an extensible
object-oriented design [15]. The test runs a benchmark from the Sunflow Rendering
System, in which it creates the image in Figure 3.2b several times and measures the
speed of creation.
3.3.6 Compression
Data compression reduces the amount of space needed to store files. When the size of
a file is halved, twice as many files can be stored for the same cost and the download
speed is twice as fast. When dealing with a large amount of files, halving the amount of
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space taken can represent a massive reduction in the space and computing required.
This leads to a large savings in power consumption and cooling which is a huge
reduction in the impact on the environment.
In order to get these benefits, a compression program needs processing time to com-
press and decompress the data. The faster this processing can be done, the more
efficient the savings from compression are.
3.3.6.1 7-Zip Compression
7-Zip is free, open source software. It creates compressed .7z files using LZMA and
LZMA2 compression [2]. The 7-Zip Compression test uses p7zip, the Linux port
of 7-zip. It measures how many MIPS (millions of instructions per second) for a
compression of the Windows x64 build using its integrated benchmark feature [6].
3.3.6.2 Gzip Compression
Gzip is a free, open source software included with most Linux distributions. It cre-
ates .tar.gz files using the DEFLATE algorithm, which is a combination of LZ77 and
Huffman coding [32]. The gzip test uses the tar utility included in most Linux distri-
butions. This test measures the time needed to archive/compress two copies of the
Linux 4.13 kernel source tree when using the tar -zcf Linux command [9]. The -z is
the option for tar to use gzip.
3.3.7 Miscellaneous
These are tests that, while useful and informative, did not fit well into any of the
previous categories.
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3.3.7.1 Bork
Bork is a small, cross-platform file encryption utility originally written in 2004. It is
written in Java and uses a stream cipher with RC4, and is able to obfuscate filenames
with SHA-1 hashing. RC4 and SHA-1 are now considered insecure [73, 64]. It was
designed to be included along with the files it encrypts for long-term (e.g. on CD)
storage, with minimal dependencies in the attempt to make it future proof. This test
measures the amount of time it takes to encrypt a sample file [5].
3.3.7.2 MAFFT
MAFFT is a free program used to create multiple sequence alignments of amino acid
or nucleotide sequences. MAFFT offers multiple alignment strategies, with tradeoffs
between speed and accuracy [41]. This test performs an alignment of 100 pyruvate de-
carboxylase sequences, with pairwise alignments computed with the Smith-Waterman
algorithm and 20000 iterative refinement cycles performed [16].
3.3.7.3 R Benchmark
The R Benchmark in the Phoronix Test Suite downloads several R benchmarks; how-
ever, only R-benchmark-25, ATT benchmark, is used. The Phoronix Test Suite ver-
sion is customized for rbench driver [11]. R-benchmark-25 is a series of R benchmarks
with three categories: matrix calculation, matrix functions, and programmation. The
matrix calculation benchmarks include: the creation, transformation and deforma-
tion of a 2500x2500 matrix, sorting of 7,000,000 random values, the cross-product a
2800x2800 matrix against itself, and the linear regression of a 3000x3000 matrix. The
matrix function benchmarks include: a FFT over 2,400,000 random values, a calcula-
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Figure 3.3: Screenshot of Unigine - Sanctuary
tion of the eigenvalues of a 640x640 random matrix, the determinant of a 2500x2500
random matrix, the Cholesky decomposition of a 3000x3000 matrix, and the invert-
ing of a 1600x1600 matrix. The programmation benchmarks include: a calculation
of 3,500,000 Fibonacci numbers, the creation of a 3000x3000 Hilbert matrix, the re-
cursive calculation of the grand common divisors of 400,000 pairs, the creation of a
500x500 Toeplitz matrix, and a calculation of Escoufier’s method on a 45x45 matrix.
The end result is the mean of each categories trimmed geometric mean [34].
3.3.7.4 SQLite
This is a simple benchmark of SQLite. SQLite is a software library that provides
a relational database management system. The lite in SQLite means light weight
in terms of setup, database administration, and required resources. SQLite has the
following noticeable features: self-contained, serverless, zero-configuration, and trans-
actional [62]. This test profile measures the time to perform a pre-defined number of
insertions on an indexed database [14].
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3.3.7.5 Unigine - Sanctuary
Unigine is a proprietary cross-platform game engine, developed by Russian software
company Unigine Corp. A trial version of the engine, called the “Evaluation Kit,”
is provided to companies working on commercial projects [69]. This test calculates
the average frame-rate within the Sanctuary demo for the Unigine 1 engine. The
Sanctuary demo has five dynamic lights, high dynamic range rendering, parallax
occlusion mapping, ambient occlusion mapping, volumetric light and fog, and particle
systems [68]. It is an interactive experience with fly-through mode of the scene in
Figure 3.3. This test includes both a windowed and a fullscreen mode with a resolution
of 800 x 600. [12].
This chapter was about the design of the experiment, how it was setup, and which
tests were used as benchmarks and why. The next chapter covers how the experiment
was setup, details about the hardware and virtual machines used, and information
about the software mitigations.
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Chapter 4
IMPLEMENTATION
To gather the data for the analysis all of the benchmarks from the previous chapter
were run at least once where they gathered a minimum of three data points per run.
Most benchmarks were run an additional time after the initial round of testing, in
order to increase the number of data points per test; however, because of how long
the pgbench benchmarks took (about 17 hours for Ubuntu 16 and about 28 hours for
Ubuntu 18) a full second run of that benchmark could not be completed. Tests were
completed for the different versions of Ubuntu 16 and 18, allowing for a comparison of
32-bit to 64-bit. Additionally, comparing across the different version numbers demon-
strates what performance loss is normal from a version update vs. the mitigations
to speculative execution attacks. Using the latest versions of Ubuntu 16, 16.04.06,
and Ubuntu 18, 18.04.02, the affect of having or not having the default mitigations
was across several core counts. This allowed for a view into the performance affect of
the mitigations on each core level and the affect of having more or less cores for each
benchmark.
The tests were completed on virtual machines with an Intel Haswell processor. The
mitigations were only tested in their default and “off” state, and mitigations that
required a kernel recompile were ignored.
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Table 4.1: Virtual Machine Information
Operating System Memory Video Memory Processors Hard Drive Size
16.04.01 8192 MB 128 MB 2 Cores 25 GB
16.04.02 8192 MB 128 MB 2 Cores 25 GB
16.04.03 8192 MB 128 MB 2 Cores 25 GB
16.04.04 8192 MB 128 MB 2 Cores 25 GB
16.04.05 8192 MB 128 MB 2 Cores 25 GB
16.04.06 8192 MB 128 MB Variable 50 GB
18.04.01 8192 MB 128 MB 2 Cores 35 GB
18.04.02 8192 MB 128 MB Variable 150 GB
4.1 Virtual Machines
Oracle VM Virtual Box, version 6.0.4 r128413 (Qt5.6.2), was used to create and
manage the virtual machines. Information about these machines can be seen in Table
4.1. Ubuntu 18 required a larger amount of hard drive space than Ubuntu 16 due
to it being a default 64-bit operating system, unlike Ubuntu 16 which is a default
32-bit. Additionally, because of its 64-bit status, gcc-multilib had to be installed
for some tests, meaning that some tests could natively use 64-bit while others could
not. Ubuntu 18.04.02 required a very large hard drive; tests with smaller hard drive
sizes (25GB, 35GB, 50GB, 75GB and 100GB) failed pgbench runs due to a size error.
Ubuntu 16.04.06 had a similar issue, but the error resolved with a 50GB hard drive
rather than 18.04.02’s 150GB.
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4.2 Host Machine
The machine used to host these tests is a Windows 10 Pro Desktop computer. It has
16GB of RAM and all of the virtual machines were run off of a 2TB hard drive.
4.2.1 CPU
The CPU used in these tests is an Intel Haswell i5-4690K. It has a clock speed of
3.50GHz and 4 cores. The Haswell micro-architecture was released in 2013 and is the
successor to the Sandy and Ivy Bridge micro-architectures. It has improvements in
the out-of-order scheduling, execution units, and memory hierarchy, and is the first
instance of Intel supporting Fused Multiply-Add operations. Additionally, several
new dispatch and memory ports were added, and several of the instruction ports
were enlarged to 256-bits, thus allowing for both increased throughput and pipeline
efficiency. The largest improvements that the Haswell can boast are to the memory
hierarchy. Its L2 TLB was substantially improved by adding support for 2MB pages
and giving it twice the number of entries. Similarly, the L1 data cache was increased
in bandwidth by a third, allowing it to sustain two 256-bit loads and a 256-bit store
every cycle [40].
4.2.2 OS Patch
On April 11th a power failure caused the host machine to update and apply the
KB4493464 OS patch. At this time the first round of Ubuntu 16 patch tests were
finished and the core test changes had started, with only the 2 cores and 2 cores vul-
nerable tests completed. This patch contained mitigations for Meltdown and Spectre
Variant 2 for VIA-based computers. and while this machine is does not have a VIA
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Table 4.2: Vulnerabilities and Mitigations
Vulnerability 16.04.04 16.04.05 16.04.06 18.04.01 18.04.02
Meltdown Default Off Default Off Default Off Default On Default On
Foreshadow Not Available Always On Always On Always On Always On
Spectre v1 Always On Always On Always On Always On Always On
Spectre v2 Default On Default On Default On Default On Default On
Speculative Store Bypass Not Available Default Off Default Off Default Off Default Off
CPU, it appears to have affected the Mostly RAM pgbench tests drastically. It is
possible, though unlikely, that there are VIA chips in the motherboard, an ASUS
Z97-A, that caused the machine to be affected; however the manufacturer states that
it uses the Intel Z97 Express Chipset [4].
4.3 Mitigations
The mitigations in this section are those that were visible when the testing was taking
place. These are displayed in the /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/ di-
rectory, where name of the file is the vulnerability and the contents either Vulnerable
or the name of the mitigation. Table 4.2 shows their default state and history for
the two different operating systems. Other vulnerabilities and attacks either were not
addressed yet by Linux or were fixed entirely by microcode updates and therefore
were not visible as a specific mitigation. Testing was between the specific operating
system’s default state and a state where all mitigations that could be disabled with-
out a kernel recompile, were. It is important to note that past versions of Ubuntu 16
and 18 also have some of the mitigations enabled.
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4.3.1 GRUB
GRUB is a boot loader for Linux that allows a user to select a specific kernel config-
uration. The options for GRUB are found in /etc/default/grub.
GRUB CMDLINE LINUX DEFAULT is used to change which mitigations are enabled. When
this file is changed, the system can be commanded to update grub and reboot, and
the resulting machine will have the default mitigations disabled.
4.3.2 Meltdown
The Meltdown vulnerability (CVE-2017-5754) can be completely mitigated in soft-
ware [47]. This mitigation is kernel page-table isolation (KPTI), previously called
KAISER.
KPTI works by separating kernel and user space into two different sets of page tables.
Kernel page tables maintain their implementation from before KPTI was introduced,
in which the page tables contain both kernel-space and user-space addresses. However,
this implementation is only used when the system is running the kernel. The user has
a different set of page tables, where there is a copy of user-space and a minimal set of
kernel-space mappings. The kernel mappings in the user page tables are required if the
process needs to enter or exit system calls, interrupts and exceptions. When leaving
user-space for kernel-space, or vice versa, the translation lookaside buffer (TLB) is
flushed [25]. Newer processors with support for the process-context identifiers (PCID)
can avoid this; however, there is still a significant performance cost, especially in
syscall-heavy and interrupt-heavy workloads.
KPTI can partially be disabled with the nopti kernel boot option. Ubuntu 16.04.06
does not have KPTI enabled by default, while Ubuntu 18.04.02 does.
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4.3.3 Foreshadow
Intel has classified all of the Foreshadow vulnerabilities (CVE-2018-3615, CVE-2018-
3620, CVE-2018-3646) as Level One Terminal Fault, L1TF, and they can be partially
mitigated in software. The most basic mitigation is Page Table Entry (PTE) Inver-
sion. By inverting all of the bits in a PTE when it is not marked as present the PTE
will point to a nonexistent region of memory [26]. This is enabled by default and
cannot be turned off without a kernel recompile.
The two additional, non-default, mitigations are only if Kernel Virtual Machine
(KVM) is enabled. The first turns off symmetric multithreading (SMT), or hyper-
threading on Intel machines. Disabling SMT can have a significant performance im-
pact, and therefore must be weighted against the impact of other mitigation solutions
like confining guests to dedicated cores. The other is to have the hypervisor flush the
L1 Data Cache (L1D) before entering the guest. Flushing the L1D evicts both guest
data and any data that should not be accessed by malicious guests. However, this
also has a performance impact as the processor has to bring the flushed guest data
back into the L1D [42]. This thesis uses Ubuntu as the Guest machine, and not the
host, so the virtual machines do not have KVM enabled. Thus, these two mitigations
can be ignored.
4.3.4 Spectre Variant 1
Spectre Variant 1 (CVE-2017-5753), can be mitigated in software only by patching
code sequences found to be vulnerable. To patch a vulnerable section, a barrier
instruction, LFENCE, is inserted in order to stop speculation. Alternatively, all
instructions can be serialized in order to stop younger instructions from executing,
even speculatively, before older instructions have retired, but LFENCE is a better
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performance solution. An LFENCE instruction inserted after a bounds check will
prevent younger operations from executing before the bound check retires. However,
it must be used carefully; if used too often, performance is compromised. Developers
are using static analysis to find these vulnerable sections, but if even one section in
a codebase is skipped the entire codebase is still vulnerable [38]. This mitigation is
enabled by default on operating systems that have it, because it is compiled into the
kernel. If a user decompiles and recompiles the kernel it can be turned off, but for
this thesis it was not.
4.3.5 Spectre Variant 2
Google developed the Full Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre Variant 2 (CVE
2017-5715). A retpoline is a “return trampoline”, where the software replaces indirect
near jump and call instructions with a code sequence that includes pushing the target
of the branch in question onto the stack and then executing a return instruction to
jump to that location, as return instructions can be protected using this method [38].
4.3.6 Speculative Store Bypass
The mitigation for Speculative Store Bypass (CVE 2018-3639) is not on by default on
either 16.04.06 or 18.04.02. This is because Intel recommends enabling this mitigation
only for managed runtimes or other situations that use language-based security to
guard against attacks within an address space. If this mitigation is enabled the
system sets the Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit in order to prevent loads from
executing before all older store addresses are known. Software that does not use
language-based security should instead carefully insert LFENCE instructions, insert
additional register dependencies between vulnerable loads and stores, or isolate secrets
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into a separate address space from code that is relying on language-based security
[38]. For the purpose of this thesis this mitigation was ignored because it was not on
by default.
This chapter was about how the experiment was setup, details about the hardware
and virtual machines used, and information about the software mitigations. The next
chapter presents both an analysis of and the results of the experiment.
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Chapter 5
RESULTS
Most benchmarks behaved as expected, with test runs with more cores outperforming
those with less, and tests with mitigations disabled outperforming those with them
enabled. While some tests demonstrate outliers these are all within testing runs that
have otherwise consistent data. Since some of these outliers appear across multiple
testing runs on different dates it was considered safe to leave them in as merely unusual
but acceptable data points. The exception to this is the Host Patch tests, where the
data before and after the patch to the Host machine was so drastically different that
it was separated out as its own graph set, and not included in the averages.
Table 5.1: Average Percent Difference Per Core Count
Core Number 16.04.02 Core 18.04.02 Core
1 core 3.40% 2.54%
2 cores 3.07% 4.93%
3 cores 3.47% 3.68%
5.1 Average Performance
Looking at the average performance of the tests prevents outliers from skewing the
data. Table 5.1 compares the average percent difference for vulnerable versus miti-
gated tests within the same core count, showing that the average variance between
tests was low. Additionally, tests were compared across both patch and core number
to see which had the best results, with best being determined by each benchmark
because some for benchmarks higher numbers are better and others, lower.
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(a) Ubuntu 16.04.06
Best Results: All Categories
(b) Ubuntu 18.04.02
Best Results: All Categories
Figure 5.1: Best Results: All Categories, Core Number and Vulnerabilities
Figure 5.1 compares the results of each benchmark for all of the possible core counts.
It shows that for Ubuntu 16, 3 cores vulnerable is almost always the best, while for
Ubuntu 18 the results are more spread out. The Ubuntu 18 results may be affected
by the patch to the host machine, and on the benchmarks where this looks possible
it is called out.
Figure 5.2 compares the results by looking only at each core level, in order to examine
whether mitigations had an impact. Interestingly, for Ubuntu 16, when there is more
than one core the vulnerable version is almost always better. Likely because many
of the mitigations involve both multiple physical and logical cores; enabling those
mitigations makes those tests slower. Thus, the mitigations don’t have much effect
when tested on only one core. As before in figure 5.1, the Ubuntu 18 results are
spread out across all categories. Notably no vulnerable category outperforms its
default counterpart, potentially due to the patch to the host machine.
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(a) Ubuntu 16.04.06
Best Results: Mitigated vs. Vulnerable
(b) Ubuntu 18.04.02
Best Results: Mitigated vs. Vulnerable
Figure 5.2: Best Results: Mitigated vs. Vulnerable
(a) Ubuntu 16
Best Results: All Categories
(b) Ubuntu 18
Best Results: All Categories
Figure 5.3: Best Results: All Categories, Patch Level
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Figure 5.4: Best Results: Patches
Figure 5.5: Best Results: Cores
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Figure 5.6: Best Results: All
Figure 5.7: Best Results: All
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Figure 5.3 compares the results only across different patch levels within their version.
Doing this reveals that the best Ubuntu 16 version appears to be 16.04.05, which has
the same default mitigations as 16.04.06. Likewise, Ubuntu 18.04.01 has the same
mitigations enabled by default as its competitor. This could mean that the large
gulf between the patch levels is due to the additional micro-op patches for unstated
vulnerabilities.
All patch results can be seen in figure 5.4, where it can be seen that Ubuntu 18.04.01
is the best version when using two cores and default mitigations. This is unexpected
because by default Ubuntu 18 has one more mitigation, kpti, turned on than Ubuntu
16. Therefore, this must be a combination of Ubuntu 18 being a 64-bit native oper-
ating system and benchmarks having adapted to that.
Figure 5.5 compares the results from all tests that changed the number of cores
and disabled mitigations. This shows that Ubuntu 18.04.02 with 3 cores is the best,
followed by two more 18.04.02 results with different core levels. Ubuntu 16.04.06 with
3 cores vulnerable does not appear until after these two results, thus again showing
how powerful the 64 bit operating system is.
In figure 5.6 the result of all tests compared against each other can be seen. Again,
Ubuntu 18 is shown to be superior, and interestingly 18.04.01 can almost compete
with 18.04.02 even when it is at one less core. Like figure 5.4 ,this emphasizes both
the power of a native 64-bit operating system, even when the Meltdown mitigation,
kpti, is different between Ubuntu 16 and 18. It also shows how brutal the 18.04.02
micro-op changes are, since the earlier patch can compete with a later version utilizing
an additional core.
Lastly, figure 5.7 shows only mitigated versus vulnerable results compared. The
vulnerable results are the explicitly vulnerable Ubuntu 16.04.06 and 18.04.02 tests
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and the versions of Ubuntu from before Meltdown- and Spectre-type attacks emerged,
specifically 16.04.01, 16.04.02, and 16.04.03. The mitigated results are the default
Ubuntu 16.04.06 and 18.04.02 tests as well as the other Ubuntu 16 and 18 patches.
Here it can be seen that the number of tests that do better without mitigations
is almost equal to the number that do better with mitigations. This shows that
while many tests are affected by the software mitigations, it is not the overwhelming
majority. Thus, if a user wanted to have better performance they would need to
research their usecase specifically, and could not necessarily get a performance increase
by removing their mitigations.
5.2 PostgreSQL
The pgbench Benchmarks have the most diversity when looking at the effect of both
patch and core differences. They are almost universally better with a higher core
number and with mitigations disabled. Additionally, these benchmarks are extremely
affected by the patch to the host machine, as seen by figures 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10. Because
of this massive disparity in performance, data from before and after the patch has
been separated.
Table 5.2: Buffer Tests Benchmark Best Averages
Benchmark 16 Patch 16.04.02 Core 18 Patch 18.04.02 Core
Heavy Contention - RO 16.04.01 3 cores vulnerable 18.04.01 3 cores vulnerable
Heavy Contention - RW 16.04.04 3 cores vulnerable 18.04.01 3 cores
Normal Load - RO 16.04.01 3 cores vulnerable 18.04.01 3 cores vulnerable
Normal Load - RW 16.04.05 3 cores vulnerable 18.04.02 3 cores vulnerable
Single Thread - RO 16.04.03 1 core 18.04.01 1 core vulnerable
Single Thread - RW 16.04.04 2 cores vulnerable 18.04.01 1 core
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Table 5.3: Buffer Tests Benchmark Percent Difference of Average
Benchmark 16 Patch 16.04.02 Core 18 Patch 18.04.02 Core
Heavy Contention - RO 8.02 97.96 19.67 104.96
Heavy Contention - RW 43.98 59.12 5.32 74.58
Normal Load - RO 12.55 98.41 18.55 106.23
Normal Load - RW 43.71 65.77 2.44 73.66
Single Thread - RO 27.89 57.21 7.09 61.08
Single Thread - RW 17.25 10.52 11.88 3.34
5.2.1 Buffer Test
Table 5.2 shows that for the tests that use additional cores, it is almost always better
to have the mitigations disabled. Interestingly, the buffer tests are the only tests
where Ubuntu 18 has better performance than Ubuntu 16, likely due to the smaller
scale factor making up for missing optimizations. Table 5.3 shows large discrepancies
between the best and the worst for each category. Looking at figures A.7, A.8, A.9,
A.10, A.11, and A.12 this appears to be from certain tests having high degrees of
variance due to unusual outliers; however because they are single datapoint outliers
in otherwise normal tests, the outlier could be the initial cache miss.
Table 5.4: RAM Tests Benchmark Best Averages
Benchmark 16 Patch 16.04.02 Core 18 Patch 18.04.02 Core
Heavy Contention - RO 16.04.03 2 cores vulnerable 18.04.02 2 cores
Heavy Contention - RW 16.04.02 3 cores vulnerable 18.04.02 3 cores
Normal Load - RO 16.04.03 3 cores 18.04.02 3 cores
Normal Load - RW 16.04.01 3 cores vulnerable 18.04.02 3 cores vulnerable
Single Thread - RO 16.04.03 1 core 18.04.02 2 cores
Single Thread - RW 16.04.03 3 cores vulnerable 18.04.02 2 cores
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Table 5.5: RAM Tests Benchmark Percent Difference of Average
Benchmark 16 Patch 16.04.02 Core 18 Patch 18.04.02 Core
Heavy Contention - RO 7.09 9.94 199.77 14.31
Heavy Contention - RW 3.24 18.26 199.71 21.14
Normal Load - RO 8.81 41.19 199.86 45.58
Normal Load - RW 5.09 24.70 199.88 27.68
Single Thread - RO 38.03 11.51 199.97 10.54
Single Thread - RW 17.99 6.86 199.98 20.16
5.2.2 Mostly RAM
Table 5.4 shows that earlier versions of Ubuntu 16 perform better. Additionally,
16.04.06 performs better with more cores, showing that the mitigations are more
powerful than the core number for this benchmark. Within both Ubuntu 16.04.06
and 18.04.02 higher core number tests almost always win, especially when mitigations
are disabled. Although table 5.5 would indicate that the percent difference between
core levels is massive, the figures A.13, A.14, A.15, A.16, A.17, and A.18 show that
these tests share the relationship of more cores performing markedly better. These
figures also illustrate the massive discrepancy between 18.04.01 and 18.04.02.
5.2.3 Mostly RAM - Host Patch
The Mostly RAM test is the most dramatically affected by the application of the
patch to the host system. Figures 5.8, 5.9, and 5.10 show the order of magnitude
difference between the pre- and post-patch versions. Bizarrely, according to the doc-
umentation of the patch, this should have effected only VIA-based systems, which
the host machine is not. Further research into if Meltdown and Spectre mitigation
patches for other chip types are inadvertently affecting unrelated machines is needed.
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(a) 16 Cores - Read Only (b) 16 Cores - Read Write
Figure 5.8: Host Patch: Mostly RAM - Heavy Contention Results
(a) 16 Cores - Read Only (b) 16 Cores - Read Write
Figure 5.9: Host Patch: Mostly RAM - Normal Load Results
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(a) 16 Cores - Read Only (b) 16 Cores - Read Write
Figure 5.10: Host Patch: Mostly RAM - Single Thread Results
Table 5.6: On-Disk Tests Benchmark Best Averages
Benchmark 16 Patch 16.04.02 Core 18 Patch 18.04.02 Core
Heavy Contention - RO 16.04.03 3 cores vulnerable 18.04.01 3 cores
Heavy Contention - RW 16.04.01 3 cores vulnerable 18.04.01 3 cores vulnerable
Normal Load - RO 16.04.03 3 cores vulnerable 18.04.01 3 cores
Normal Load - RW 16.04.04 3 cores vulnerable 18.04.01 3 cores vulnerable
Single Thread - RO 16.04.02 1 core vulnerable 18.04.01 3 cores vulnerable
Single Thread - RW 16.04.05 1 core vulnerable 18.04.01 2 cores
5.2.4 On-Disk
Table 5.6 shows not only are all of the Ubuntu 16.04.06 tests better with mitigations
disabled, they are also almost always the best. Figures A.19, A.20, A.21, A.22,
A.23, and A.24 display a large discrepancy between Ubuntu 18.04.01 and Ubuntu
18.04.02. Interestingly this is the same discrepancy shown in the Mostly RAM tests,
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Table 5.7: On-Disk Tests Benchmark Percent Difference of Average
Benchmark 16 Patch 16.04.02 Core 18 Patch 18.04.02 Core
Heavy Contention - RO 10.05 96.73 199.28 16.27
Heavy Contention - RW 5.48 94.23 169.88 33.72
Normal Load - RO 7.07 97.56 199.50 40.49
Normal Load - RW 3.88 89.75 175.03 26.73
Single Thread - RO 19.40 67.51 198.99 17.57
Single Thread - RW 14.90 11.14 165.15 8.35
but in the opposite direction. While most of the figures show the same stair-stepping
visualization as other tests where having more cores is critical, several of the Ubuntu
18.04.02 core results are instead more randomized, likely due to the impact of the
mitigations.
Table 5.8: DaCapo Benchmark Best Averages
Benchmark 16 Patch 16.04.02 Core 18 Patch 18.04.02 Core
Eclipse 16.04.01 3 cores vulnerable 18.04.01 3 cores
H2 16.04.01 2 cores vulnerable 18.04.01 2 cores vulnerable
Jython 16.04.02 3 cores vulnerable 18.04.01 3 cores
Tradebeans 16.04.02 3 cores vulnerable 18.04.02 3 cores
Tradesoap 16.04.02 3 cores vulnerable 18.04.01 3 cores vulnerable
Table 5.9: DaCapo Benchmark Percent Difference of Average
Benchmark 16 Patch 16.04.02 Core 18 Patch 18.04.02 Core
Eclipse 7.18 61.24 1.90 63.02
H2 32.53 34.19 3.13 19.37
Jython 4.42 72.65 2.23 68.41
Tradebeans 4.52 76.93 0.18 76.16
Tradesoap 12.75 86.21 2.35 87.69
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5.3 DaCapo
Table 5.9 shows that all of the DaCapo benchmarks are affected by core count, as
expected. Some benchmarks, Eclipse, H2, and Jython, do poorly with one core but
the performance with two and three cores is similar. The other DaCapo benchmarks,
Tradebeans and Tradesoap, are more sensitive to having two than three cores. The
table additionally shows that within patch levels there is little percent difference. H2
has a significant variance when looking at Ubuntu 16 patches, but Figure A.26 shows
that is due to an unusually large amount of variance within 16.04.04. Table 5.8 makes
it seem like disabling the mitigations is the right choice for better performance on the
DaCapo benchmarks. However these graphs show that the gain is not significant for
any of the benchmarks.
Table 5.10: SciMark: ANSI C Benchmark Best Averages
Benchmark 16 Patch 16.04.02 Core 18 Patch 18.04.02 Core
Dense LU 16.04.05 1 core 18.04.01 1 core
FFT 16.04.02 3 cores vulnerable 18.04.01 2 cores
Jacobi SOR 16.04.05 1 core 18.04.01 1 core
Monte Carlo 16.04.05 1 core 18.04.01 1 core
Sparse MM 16.04.05 1 core 18.04.01 1 core
Composite 16.04.05 1 core 18.04.01 1 core
5.4 SciMark
Tables 5.10 and 5.12 show that there is little difference between either patch levels
or core number for either ANSI C or Java SciMark. This is likely because these are
fairly small math benchmarks that both processor and operating system creators use
to optimize their product before it is released. It is still useful to investigate them
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Table 5.11: SciMark: ANSI C Benchmark Percent Difference of Average
Benchmark 16 Patch 16.04.02 Core 18 Patch 18.04.02 Core
Dense LU 1.84 2.39 1.65 3.36
FFT 6.75 1.97 1.08 2.30
Jacobi SOR 1.29 2.36 1.00 2.53
Monte Carlo 2.18 3.29 1.19 3.94
Sparse MM 1.22 1.93 1.77 3.96
Composite 1.22 1.67 1.37 3.07
Table 5.12: SciMark: Java Benchmark Best Averages
Benchmark 16 Patch 16.04.02 Core 18 Patch 18.04.02 Core
Dense LU 16.04.01 3 cores vulnerable 18.04.01 1 core
FFT 16.04.05 2 cores vulnerable 18.04.02 2 cores
Jacobi SOR 16.04.05 2 cores vulnerable 18.04.01 1 core
Monte Carlo 16.04.05 2 cores vulnerable 18.04.01 1 core
Sparse MM 16.04.05 1 core 18.04.01 1 core
Composite 16.04.05 2 cores vulnerable 18.04.01 1 core
Table 5.13: SciMark: Java Benchmark Percent Difference of Average
Benchmark 16 Patch 16.04.02 Core 18 Patch 18.04.02 Core
Dense LU 2.59 1.10 0.95 2.31
FFT 3.59 2.37 1.03 2.18
Jacobi SOR 5.98 1.92 1.58 2.09
Monte Carlo 5.41 1.45 1.24 2.23
Sparse MM 5.70 1.52 1.44 2.11
Composite 3.78 1.42 0.93 1.69
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to ensure nothing has gone catastrophically wrong, considering how many scientific
simulations use thousands of these operations, but their lack of a meaningful winning
category for any given SciMark test is both unsurprising and comforting.
5.5 Encoding
Table 5.14: Encoding Best Averages
Benchmark 16 Patch 16.04.02 Core 18 Patch 18.04.02 Core
LAME MP3 16.04.05 2-cores vulnerable 18.04.01 1 core
x264 16.04.02 3 cores vulnerable 18.04.01 3 cores
Table 5.15: Encoding Percent Difference of Average
Benchmark 16 Patch 16.04.02 Core 18 Patch 18.04.02 Core
LAME MP3 2.71 2.89 1.28 1.93
x264 2.14 81.67 1.61 84.35
Figure A.43 and Table 5.14 both show that the video encoding benchmark, x264,
behaves as expected, with more cores doing better than fewer cores. Additionally,
table 5.15 shows patch level having a negligible impact. This benchmark is another
interesting potential case where the host patch may have affected the Ubuntu 18
vulnerable versus default tests. While this behaves as expected, the audio encoding
benchmark, LAME MP3, does not. Table 5.15 shows that LAME MP3 is not affected
by either core number or patch level, and while A.42 shows some differences, they are
negligible. This is likely due to high levels of optimizations on LAME to enable it to
run well on anything.
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Table 5.16: Ray Tracing Best Averages
Benchmark 16 Patch 16.04.02 Core 18 Patch 18.04.02 Core
C-Ray 16.04.05 3 cores vulnerable 18.04.01 3 cores
Sunflow 16.04.02 3 cores vulnerable 18.04.01 3 cores
Table 5.17: Ray Tracing Percent Difference of Average
Benchmark 16 Patch 16.04.02 Core 18 Patch 18.04.02 Core
C-Ray 1.20 98.44 0.70 97.54
Sunflow 7.08 35.32 4.57 35.28
5.6 Ray Tracing
The ray tracing benchmarks both perform as expected. In table 5.16 it can be seen
that both ray tracing programs perform similarly and are able to utilize a larger num-
ber of cores successfully. Additionally it shows that both perform better in Ubuntu
18 than Ubuntu 16 as they are likely optimized for 64-bit operating systems. This
is supported by there being little variance in patch levels according to table 5.17.
Figure A.45 shows that the Sunflow Rendering System benchmark will not run on
less than two cores. Interestingly, while both benchmarks perform better without
mitigations for 16.04.06, it is the opposite for 18.04.02, where they are faster even
than 16.04.06 without mitigations. Taking a close look at Figures A.45 and A.44
indicates that it is the 64-bit optimizations rather than the patch to the host system
which is responsible.
Table 5.18: Compression Best Averages
Benchmark 16 Patch 16.04.02 Core 18 Patch 18.04.02 Core
7-Zip 16.04.02 3 cores vulnerable 18.04.01 2 cores
Gzip 16.04.05 3 cores vulnerable 18.04.01 3 cores
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Table 5.19: Compression Percent Difference of Average
Benchmark 16 Patch 16.04.02 Core 18 Patch 18.04.02 Core
7-zip 3.96 64.36 0.09 66.61
Gzip 1.14 5.20 3.90 6.33
5.7 Compression
The compression tests perform as expected. It is interesting to see that for both tests
Ubuntu 18.04.01 was the best; see table 5.18. The 7-Zip benchmark has a slightly
unusual bimodal distribution, Figure A.46, and seem to be able to use two cores at
most, while the Gzip tests do not display the same distribution, Figure A.47. 7-Zip’s
bimodal distribution is likely caused by caching; the test is compressing a file three
times, the first time will always be the worst and the next test runs will better because
the data will be in one of the cache levels. If this test was improved it would compress
the file multiple times each run and average the time, or compress a file that was much
larger than the last level cache. Interestingly, both figure A.46 and table 5.18 show
that for 7-Zip, there are no benefits of more than two cores, while gzip, Figure A.47,
has little difference at any core level. Additionally, table 5.19 show that there is little
variance with different patch levels for either test. Lastly, the gzip Ubuntu 18 tests
have a better average speed than their Ubuntu 16 counterparts, meaning that the
tar function in Ubuntu 18 is better optimized.
5.8 Miscellaneous
The tests in this section show a typical reaction in that the test runs with higher core
numbers were almost universally the best.
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Table 5.20: Miscellaneous Best Averages
Benchmark 16 Patch 16.04.02 Core 18 Patch 18.04.02 Core
Bork 16.04.06 3 cores vulnerable 18.04.01 2 cores
MAFFT 16.04.01 3 cores vulnerable 18.04.02 3 cores vulnerable
R 16.04.02 2 cores vulnerable 18.04.02 3 cores vulnerable
SQLite 16.04.04 1 core 18.04.02 2 cores
Uengine - Fullscreen 16.04.04 3 cores vulnerable 18.04.01 3 cores
Uengine - Windowed 16.04.04 3 cores 18.04.01 3 cores
Table 5.21: Miscellaneous Percent Difference of Average
Benchmark 16 Patch 16.04.02 Core 18 Patch 18.04.02 Core
Bork 38.62 39.53 1.43 57.32
MAFFT 8.42 87.75 0.10 84.84
R 5.28 4.45 0.38 3.00
SQLite 41.23 33.77 3.33 25.56
Uengine - Fullscreen 3.99 94.56 0.75 93.64
Uengine - Windowed 4.21 94.87 1.61 94.03
5.8.1 Bork
The Bork test is unusual as an outlier in this regard, but this is likely caused by its
larger variance when compared to the other tests in this section. This variance can be
seen in Figure A.48, where some of the plots stretch in unusual ways. Additionally,
when comparing the percent difference in the testing runs, seen in Table 5.21, the
Ubuntu 18 Patches have smallest percent difference, confirming how similar the data
is between the two runs. In contrast the different core levels of 18 have the largest
variance, but this is likely due the extreme anomalous behavior shown in 2-cores
vulnerable. Figure A.48 shows that Ubuntu 18 tests are faster on average than their
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Ubuntu 16 counterparts, and table 5.20 has Ubuntu 18.04.01 as the best result.
5.8.2 MAFFT
The tests for MAAFT behaved as expected. Figure A.49 shows that the number of
cores provided was the biggest impact, and when compared Ubuntu 18 always was
faster than Ubuntu 16 for the same number of cores or vulnerabilities, which likely
means that it is optimized for 64-bit operating systems. Table 5.21 shows a small
variance between patches, and figure A.49 likewise indicates a small variance between
vulnerable and default core configurations.
5.8.3 R
On the graphs of the R benchmark, Figure A.50, there appears to be a large amount
of variance. This isn’t unusual because as a timing benchmark with such a small
footprint (less than two seconds), it is likely that this is due to background processes
on either the virtual box or host system. The benchmark apears to be affected by
the mitigations given that its best averages are without them, as shown in Table
5.20. Table 5.21 shows that the percent difference between runs is small, so it seems
affected by the mitigations, but without more data from other sources it is hard to
know if it is just a coincidence.
5.8.4 SQLite
The SQLite tests are unusual in that they do not perform better for having more
cores, easily seen in table 5.20. This is likely because, as a Lite model, it is designed
without the heavy threading that would take advantage of the higher core number.
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Additionally, these tests have a high degree of variance, table 5.21, which is likely
caused by some of the tests having extreme outliers; see figure A.51.
5.8.5 Unigine
Both tests for Unigine behaved as expected, with the number of cores being the most
important aspect. Figures A.53 and A.52 show that the number of cores provided
was the biggest impact. When compared Ubuntu 16 always was faster than Ubuntu
18, which is likely due to the Unigine Sanctuary test being the oldest Unigine test
and thus optimized for the 32-bit operating system. Although table 5.20 shows a
difference between the windowed and fullscreen tests for mitigation impact, looking
at figures A.53 and A.52 show that the data is so close it is negligible. Additionally,
table 5.21 shows that the data between patches has little variance.
This chapter presented both an analysis of and the results of the experiment. The next
chapter contains information on potential future work, including future experiments
and additional variables.
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Chapter 6
FUTURE WORK
Recording the total impact from the mitigations to stop Meltdown and Spectre is a
Herculean task. The number of potential combinations is enormous, and the com-
putation time for the tests inside this thesis is non-trivial. Considering how quickly
new Speculative Execution attacks are being discovered, it is very likely that a new
attack will be discovered and mitigated before the testing is complete.
6.1 Motherboards
Additional experimentation is needed to determine if the motherboard, specifically
the chipsets on the motherboard, are affected by the mitigations to the speculative
execution attacks. The impact that the patch to the Host machine had in this exper-
iment shows patches which should have no impact, due to the processor not being of
the type being patched, can still have an impact. Although investigation into the Host
machine’s motherboard indicated a lack of the chip being patched, further searching
revealed that, to the OS, the motherboard is only known as “legacy,” which could
indicate a blanket patching strategy to deal with the unknown chipset.
6.2 Combination
To have a comprehensive analysis, all possible combinations of mounting, operating
system, hardware, and active mitigation must be tested extensively. Table 6.1 shows
an example of how many variables could exist in a full experiment.
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Table 6.1: Further Testing Variables for Combination
Mount OS Hardware Mitigation
Bare Metal Mac OS ARM Cortex R Series L1TF
Oracle Virtual Box Android ARM Cortex A Series Spec. Store Bypass
VMware Workstation Windows 7 AMD Ryzen Spectre v1
VMware Fusion Windows 8 AMD Athlon Spectre v2
Parallels Desktop Windows 10 AMD Threadripper Meltdown
Ubuntu 12.04 Intel Nehalem
Ubuntu 14.04 Intel Sandy Bridge
Ubuntu 16.04 Intel Ivy Bridge
Ubuntu 18.04 Intel Haswell
Intel Broadwell
Intel Skylake
Intel Kaby Lake
Intel Coffee Lake
Intel Cannon Lake
Intel Ice Lake
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6.2.1 Mounting
Because the mitigations affect Virtual Machines differently than a Bare Metal mount,
both should be tested extensively. However, there will be slight differences in how
the internal guest machines are affected due to the implementation that each Virtual
Machine software takes. Therefore, multiple Virtual Machine softwares should be
used, in order to normalize out implementation specific details.
6.2.2 Operating Systems
This work addressed only two operating systems (Linux 16.04 and Linux 18.04) and
their respective patch levels on a virtual machine operating on a Windows 10 host.
To see the full impact on an operating system level, all affected operating systems
should be benchmarked. Additionally, because the mitigations affect the performance
of virtual machines, a fully comprehensive study must take into account all possible
permutations of Virtual Machine Software, Client OS, and Host OS, as well as the
respective patch-levels of each.
6.2.3 Hardware
Due to the number of CPUs affected by the mitigations, it is equally prudent to
see how much each CPU has potentially lost in performance. The tests should be
performed across different micro-architectures by company, but also different varia-
tions within each architectural generation should be tested. These variations can vary
greatly from each in core number, cache amount, memory hierarchy, and clock rate.
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6.2.3.1 Mitigation
In order to see the full impact of each mitigation tests must be performed with
different mitigations turned on or off. Unless that is done the impact of the individual
mitigations and how they perform with each other mitigation will only be guesswork.
However, that means that for each new speculative execution attack and subsequent
mitigation that the amount of testing to do increases massively. Additionally, new
speculative execution attacks are being published frequently enough that a new one
can be published in the middle of experimentation. This happened to this paper,
as the MDS attacks and their software mitigation were published after these results
were gathered.
6.3 Computation Time
The benchmarks demonstrated in this thesis take 20 hours to complete, for a single
run. Therefore, the time to test all of the potential combinations represented in Table
6.1 is:
tt ∗ (os ∗ hw ∗m + vm ∗ (hos ∗m) ∗ (gos ∗m) ∗ hw)
The section for baremetal testing time and the section for virtual machine testing
time are separated, and the variables correspond as follows: test time: tt; hardware
permutations: hw; mitigation permutations: m; virtual machine software permuta-
tions: vm; host os permutations: hos; and guest os permutations: gos. The result of
this equation is:
20 ∗ (5 ∗ 15 ∗ 32 + 4 ∗ (5 ∗ 32) ∗ (5 ∗ 32) ∗ 15) = 30768000 hours
which is equivalent to about 3512 years of computation time. This doesn’t take into
account that not all operating systems can run virtual machines, or that there would
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be setup time in order to decompile the kernel in order to test some mitigations like
Spectre v1. This equation also does not take into account all of the different patch
levels that should be checkd for both Host and Guest machines. Additionally, if
further research into the patch on the host machine shows that motherboard chipsets
are affected by the patches, another variable and all of it’s permutations are added
to the equation. While the tests obviously shouldn’t be done sequentially, the total
computing times shows how large this task is.
This chapter covered potential future experiments, both to find additional quantita-
tive results and to find or eliminate additional possible variables. The next and final
chapter presents the conclusions of the paper.
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSION
The result of the tests were not surprising. As expected, almost all benchmarks
benefited greatly from an increased core count. These benchmarks were either the
newer or more complex benchmarks whose developers optimized for the additional
performance the increase in core number can give. Simpler benchmarks were less
effected by either core count or having mitigations turned off. Surprisingly, even
though Ubuntu 16 did not have the Meltdown mitigation, kpti, enabled by default,
it did not outperform Ubuntu 18. This shows that being 64-bit native is more of a
performance impact than the kpti mitigation. The biggest surprise was the impact
of the accidental patch to the host, which according to Windows, should have only
affected VIA-based systems. Although many benchmarks showed affect, the degree
of change was mostly small.
These tests showed that currently, the number of benchmarks that performed better
without mitigations was almost equal to the number that performed better with
the mitigations enabled. Thus, while many benchmarks are affected by the software
mitigations, it is not the overwhelming majority. Therefore, users seeking performance
gain must research their individual usecase, as there does not seem to be a blanket
gain by disabling mitigations.
Some microarchitectural exploits can only be fixed in hardware. Processor manufac-
turers are attempting to create new designs that are not vulnerable to Meltdown-
and Spectre-type exploits However, even as these designs are created new exploits are
discovered that need to be protected against, causing additional temporary software
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Figure 7.1: Branchless Doom
mitigations. Consumers seeking top performance will need to continue to follow the
news about these exploits and mitigations.
The problem of performance versus security will continue as long as computers exist,
if not longer. Figure 7.1 shows the video-game Doom reprogrammed entirely in
move instructions, thus removing all branch instructions and becoming immune to
Meltdown- and Spectre-type attacks. Unfortunately, as it can only render one frame
every seven hours, it shows that this isn’t a feasible strategy for protecting against
these attacks [28].
The flaws exposed by Meltdown and Spectre are pebbles in an avalanche, causing se-
curity researchers to tear apart hardware diagrams and undocumented optimizations.
Eventually they will be fixed, and new optimizations will be added that will in turn
be targeted, starting the cycle anew.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
INDIVIDUAL TEST RESULT GRAPHS
(a) 16 Cores - Read Only (b) 16 Cores - Read Write
Figure A.1: Host Patch: pgbench Buffer Test - Heavy Contention Results
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(a) 16 Cores - Read Only (b) 16 Cores - Read Write
Figure A.2: Host Patch: pgbench Buffer Test - Normal Load Results
(a) 16 Cores - Read Only (b) 16 Cores - Read Write
Figure A.3: Host Patch: pgbench Buffer Test - Single Thread Results
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(a) 16 Cores - Read Only (b) 16 Cores - Read Write
Figure A.4: Host Patch: pgbench On-Disk - Heavy Contention Results
(a) 16 Cores - Read Only (b) 16 Cores - Read Write
Figure A.5: Host Patch: pgbench On-Disk - Normal Load Results
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(a) 16 Cores - Read Only (b) 16 Cores - Read Write
Figure A.6: Host Patch: pgbench On-Disk - Single Thread Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.7: pgbench Buffer Test - Heavy Contention - Read Only Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.8: pgbench Buffer Test - Heavy Contention - Read Write Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.9: pgbench Buffer Test - Normal Load - Read Only Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.10: pgbench Buffer Test - Normal Load - Read Write Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.11: pgbench Buffer Test - Single Thread - Read Only Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.12: pgbench Buffer Test - Single Thread - Read Write Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.13: pgbench Mostly RAM - Heavy Contention - Read Only Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.14: pgbench Mostly RAM - Heavy Contention - Read Write Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.15: pgbench Mostly RAM - Normal Load - Read Only Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.16: pgbench Mostly RAM - Normal Load - Read Write Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.17: pgbench Mostly RAM - Single Thread - Read Only Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.18: pgbench Mostly RAM - Single Thread - Read Write Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.19: pgbench On-Disk - Heavy Contention - Read Only Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.20: pgbench On-Disk - Heavy Contention - Read Write Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.21: pgbench On-Disk - Normal Load - Read Only Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.22: pgbench On-Disk - Normal Load - Read Write Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.23: pgbench On-Disk - Single Thread - Read Only Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.24: pgbench On-Disk - Single Thread - Read Write Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.25: DaCapo Eclipse Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.26: DaCapo H2 Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.27: DaCapo Jython Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.28: DaCapo Tradebeans Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.29: DaCapo Tradesoap Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.30: SciMark: Java - Dense LU Matrix Factorization Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.31: SciMark: ANSI C - Dense LU Matrix Factorization Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.32: SciMark: Java - Fast Fourier Transform Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.33: SciMark: ANSI C - Fast Fourier Transform Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.34: SciMark: Java - Jacobi Successive Over-Relaxation Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.35: SciMark: ANSI C - Jacobi Successive Over-Relaxation Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.36: SciMark: Java - Monte Carlo Results
123
(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.37: SciMark: ANSI C - Monte Carlo Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.38: SciMark: Java - Sparse Matrix Multiply Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.39: SciMark: ANSI C - Sparse Matrix Multiply Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.40: SciMark: Java - Composite Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.41: SciMark: ANSI C - Composite Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.42: LAME MP3 Encoding: WAV To MP3 Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.43: x264 Video Encoding Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.44: C-Ray Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.45: Sunflow Rendering System Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.46: 7-zip Compression Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.47: Gzip Compression Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.48: Bork Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.49: Timed MAFFT Alignment Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.50: R Benchmark Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.51: SQLite Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.52: Unigine Fullscreen Results
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(a) 16 Patches (b) 18 Patches
(c) Ubuntu 16.04.06 Cores (d) Ubuntu 18.04.2 Cores
Figure A.53: Unigine Windowed Results
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